The notion of slow provability for Peano Arithmetic (PA) was introduced by S.-D. Friedman, M. Rathjen, and A. Weiermann. They studied the slow consistency statement Con s asserting that a contradiction is not slow provable in PA. They showed that the logical strength of the theory PA + Con s lies strictly between that of PA, and PA together with its ordinary consistency: PA PA + Con s PA + Con PA . This paper is a further investigation into slow provability and its interplay with ordinary provability in PA. We study three variants of slow provability. The associated consistency statement of each of these yields a theory that lies strictly between PA and PA+Con PA in terms of logical strength. We investigate Turing-Feferman progressions based on these variants of slow provability. For our three notions, the TuringFeferman progression reaches PA + Con PA in a different numbers of steps, namely ε 0 , ω, and 2. For each of the three slow provability predicates, we also determine its joint provability logic with ordinary PA-provability.
Introduction
Slow provability, introduced by S.-D. Friedman, M. Rathjen, and A. Weiermann in [9] , is a notion of nonstandard provability for Peano Arithmetic (PA) -while we know that it coincides with ordinary provability for PA, this fact is not verifiable in PA itself. This paper is a further investigation into the relation between slow and ordinary provability, as seen from the perspective of PA.
The definition of slow provability relies on a fast-growing hiearachy, also known as the extended Grzegorczyk hieararchy. What we mean by this is, following [9] , an ordinal-indexed family of recursive functions {F α } α≤ε 0 . The functions {F α } α<ω are closely related to a family of classes of functions known as the Grzegorczyk hierarchy ( [12] ). They are primitive recursive, and furthermore every primitive recursive function is dominated by some function in {F α } α<ω . Löb and Wainer ( [16] , [17] ) extended the hierarchy into the transfinite. The exact version of the fast-growing hierarchy used in [9] was introduced by Solovay and Ketonen ([14] ). The function F ε 0 results from diagonalizing over the functions {F ωn } n∈ω , each of which is provably total in PA, and is not provably total in PA itself. This makes it interesting to consider the following r.e. theory:
where IΣ n is as usual PA with the induction schema restricted to Σ n -formulas. Since F ε 0 is total, we know that PA↾ Fε 0 and PA have exactly the same theorems. Arguing in PA, on the other hand, the totality of F ε 0 cannot be assumed, and thus PA↾ Fε 0 might seem to be a weaker theory than PA. As shown in [9] , there exist indeed models of PA where a contradiction is provable in PA but not in PA↾ Fε 0 . A notion of slow provability can be associated to any recursive function f not provably total in PA, by considering the theory
Since the equivalence of PA and PA↾ f might not be verifiable in PA, it is interesting to ask how exactly do the two theories relate to each other, as seen from the perspective of PA. This paper offers some ways of answering the above question.
Results of this paper
Denote by Con PA , the usual consistency statement for PA, and by Con f the statement expressing that a contradiction is not provable in PA↾ f . As mentioned above, Con f need not be provably equivalent to Con PA . However it is conceivable that by iterating Con f sufficiently many times, a statement equivalent to Con PA is reached. We explore this possibility by considering transfinite iterations of slow consistency statements. Given a non-zero ordinal α ≤ ε 0 , the α-iteration Con α f of Con f is informally defined as the consistency statement for the theory
We adopt the provability logic approach to transfinite iterations, developing the notion of a transfinite iteration Pr α (x) of a provability predicate Pr(x) along a Kalmar elementary well-ordering. We show that these iterations satisfy the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions, and can thus be considered as provability predicates themselves (Section 4).
We show that the ε 0 -iteration of Con Fε 0 is equivalent to Con PA (Theorem 10), thus answering a question raised in [9, Remark 4.4] . We also show that a small index shift in the definition of PA↾ Fε 0 yields a slow consistency statement whose ω-iteration is already equivalent to Con PA (Theorem 5). While finishing writing this paper, the authors learned that the above results are also contained in Anton Freunds recent paper [8] . The results of our paper were obtained independently from the latter.
We also introduce a variant of slow provability that can be seen as the square root of ordinary PA-provability, in the sense that already the two-fold iteration of the associated slow consistency statement is equivalent to Con PA (Theorem 12). Our slow provability variant is the first example of such a provability predicate in the context of PA.
For each of our three notions of slow provability, we determine its joint provability logic with ordinary PA-provability. While the slow provability predicate studied in [9] and its shifted version mentioned above behave very differently when it comes to transfinite iterations, their joint provability logic with ordinary provability is the same, namely Lindström logic (Theorem 16). It was shown in [15] that the latter is also the joint provability logic of ordinary and Parikh provability, which can be seen as a speeded up version of ordinary PA-provability. Our proof or arithmetical completeness is rather general and works for a large class of pairs of provability predicates, including ordinary and Parikh provability.
Overview of this paper
Sections 2 and 3 contain the basic results and notions used in the paper. Section 4 introduces transfinite iterations of provability predicates. The notion of slow provability, along with some results from [9] , forms the content of Section 5. In Section 6 we show that in some cases provability in PA implies a certain transfinite iteration of slow provability. Section 7 deals with the converse. The joint provability logic of slow and ordinary provability is determined in Section 9. The material in this section relies only on sections 2 and 5.
History and context
We point out some developments related to the subject matter of this paper.
Nonstandard notions of provability for PA
The method of arithmetization developed by Gödel allows PA to talk about basic syntactical notions. In particular, there is an arithmetical formula Pr PA (x), the so-called provability predicate, that expresses basic facts about provability in PA. Writing Con PA for the sentence ¬Pr PA (⊥), Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem states that Con PA is not provable in PA.
Since Pr PA (x) is, prima facie, an arithmetical formula, one may justifiably ask what exactly is meant by calling it a provability predicate. Could there be another provability predicate whose associated consistency statement is provable in PA? Likewise, which properties of Pr PA (x) does the proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem rely on?
Such questions were for the first time investigated by Feferman in his influential paper [5] . He constructs a predicate Pr * PA (x) that has the same extension as Pr PA (x) on the natural numbers, whose associated consistency statement is however provable in PA. The existence of such a nonstandard provability predicate illustrates the need for a more careful formulation of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
In order to demonstrate the difficulty of singling out one "standard" provability predicate for PA, Feferman ([5, Theorem 7.4, 7.5]) provides a rather general method for modifying a given provability predicate Pr(x), so as to obtain new provability predicates Pr ′ (x) and Pr ′′ (x) for the same theory, whose associated consistency statements lie strictly below and above the original one respectively:
In particular, we obtain a theory lying between PA and PA+Con PA in terms of logical strength. Since the above method relies on self-reference, in the form of a Rosser-style construction, it is reasonable to ask whether a natural theory with this property can also be found. The theory PA + Con Fε 0 , obtained by adding to PA the statement of its slow consistency, may be seen as the first example of such a theory. Another example of nonstandard provability is the so-called Parikh provability. An arithmetical sentence ϕ is said to be Parikh provable if it is provable in PA together with Parkih's rule, where the latter allows one to infer ϕ from the sentence Pr PA (ϕ). Since Parikh's rule is admissible in PA, adding it to PA does not yield new theorems. As shown in [18] , it does yield speed-up, meaning that some theorems have much shorter proofs when Parikh's rule is allowed. The equivalence of Parikh provability and ordinary provability is however not verifiable in PA.
Slow provability for weak theories
A notion of slow provability in the context of Kalmar Elementary Arithmetic (EA) was introduced by Visser in [27] . He uses a superexponential (not provably total in EA) function in order to modify the standard provability predicate of EA. As in the case of slow provability for PA, the associated slow consistency statement lies strictly between EA and EA + Con EA in terms of logical strength.
A version of square root provability for I∆ 0 +Exp was also found by Visser: it is shown in [26] that cut-free or tableaux provability serve as the square root of ordinary provability in the context of I∆ 0 +Exp.
Provability logic
The idea of viewing Pr PA (x) as a modal operator goes back to Gödel ([11] ). Hilbert and Bernays formulated certain conditions for Pr PA (x) that would suffice for the proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. These were later simplified by Löb, and are now referred to as the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions:
The system GL of propositional modal logic is axiomatized by adding to the basic modal logic K the following, known as Löb's axiom: ( A → A) → A. It was proven by Solovay ([23] ) that GL is the provability logic of PA: its theorems are exactly the propositional schemata involving Pr PA (x) that are provable in PA.
Solovay's method has been used to apply modal logic to study other metamathematical predicates besides Pr PA (x). Shavrukov ( [22] ) determined the joint provability logic of ordinary and Feferman provability Pr * PA (x). The joint provability logic of ordinary and Parikh provability was established by Lindström ([15] ).
Turing-Feferman progressions
The idea of transfinite iterations of consistency statements goes back to Turing ( [25] ). Given a sufficiently strong Σ 1 -sound theory T, consider the sequence of theories given by: T 0 := T, and T n+1 := T n + Con T n for all n. It follows from the Second Incompleteness Theorem that each T n+1 is a strictly stronger theory than T n . In his doctoral thesis [25] , Turing introduced the method of transfinite iterations, allowing one to extend the above sequence into the transfinite. Given a theory T and an ordinal α, the theory T α is informally defined as:
Returning to transfinite iterations of consistency statements introduced informally in (3) above, we note that using the notation of (5), we have that for α > 0, PA↾ f + Con α f is the theory (PA↾ f ) α . A proper construction of the above sequence of theories requires a recursive ordinal notation system. As shown in [25, 6] , the properties of T α for infinite α depend significantly on the choice of the ordinal notation system. These difficulties will not influence our paper, however, as we shall only consider ordinals α ≤ ε 0 , identifying any such α with its representation in Cantor normal form.
Arithmetical theories
We consider first-order theories formulated in the language L of arithmetic containing 0, S (successor), +, ×, and ≤. As usual, an L-formula is said to be ∆ 0 (equivalently: Σ 0 or Π 0 ) if all its quantifiers are bounded, and Σ n+1 (Π n+1 ) if it is of the form ∃x 0 . . . x n ϕ, with ϕ a Π n (Σ n )-formula. We write n for the L-term corresponding to n, i.e. 0 followed by n applications of S. Given this, we shall mostly write n instead of n.
The basic facts concerning 0, S, +, ×, and ≤ are given by the axioms of the theory Q of Robinson Arithmetic ([13, Definition I.1.1]). The theory Q is Σ 1 -complete, meaning that it proves every true Σ 1 -sentence.
Our main interest in this article is the theory PA of Peano Arithmetic that results from adding to Q the induction schema for all arithmetical formulas. As usual, IΣ n denotes the fragment of PA obtained by restricting the induction schema to Σ n -formulas. Clearly, IΣ n ⊆ IΣ n+1 for all n, and PA = n∈ω IΣ n . We shall therefore sometimes also write IΣ ω for PA. Using that satisfaction for Σ n -formulas is definable in IΣ 1 by a Σ n -formula, one can show that for all n > 0, IΣ n is finitely axiomatisable ([13, Theorem I.2.52], see also Section 2.2 below).
As our metatheory, we mostly use I∆ 0 +Exp. In order to introduce the latter, we recall that there is a ∆ 0 -formula ϕ e (x, y, z) that defines, provably in I∆ 0 , the graph of a recursively defined exponentiation function e(x, y) = x y ([13, Theorem V.3.15]), i.e. we have:
The sentence stating the totality of this function:
is not provable in I∆ 0 . The theory I∆ 0 +Exp is the result from adding (6) as an additional axiom to I∆ 0 . We recall that I∆ 0 +Exp is finitely axiomatizable ([13, Theorem V.5.6 ]).
Since the formula defining exponentiation in I∆ 0 is ∆ 0 , I∆ 0 +Exp is a conservative extension of Elementary Arithmetic (EA). By EA, we mean the theory formulated in the language of arithmetic, together with a function symbol exp for exponentiation. It contains the basic facts concerning 0, S, +, ×, ≤ and exp, plus induction for all ∆ 0 -formulas of the extended language. EA is strong enough to formalize almost all of finitary mathematics outside logic.
Representing recursive functions in I∆ 0 +Exp
It is well-known that a coding of sequences can be carried out inside I∆ 0 +Exp. Using that, it is straightforward to show that every primitive recursive relation R can be represented inside I∆ 0 +Exp by a Σ 1 -formula ϕ R , in the sense that for all n 0 , . . . , n k ,
We recall that there are primitive recursive functions T and U with the property that for all recursive f, there exists some e, such that for all n,
Thus we can associate to any recursive function f a Σ 1 -formula ϕ f that defines f in a natural way, say by mimicking its definition in (8) . If f is k-ary, then for all n 1 , . . . , n k , we have that
Since I∆ 0 +Exp is Σ 1 -sound, it follows that for any recursively enumerable (r.e.) set A, there is a Σ 1 -formula ϕ A such that for all n, n ∈ A if and only if I∆ 0 +Exp ⊢ ϕ A (n). In fact, as was first shown in [4] , given any extension S of I∆ 0 +Exp and any r.e. set A, there is a Σ 1 -formula ϕ A such that for all n, n ∈ A if and only if S ⊢ ϕ A (n). Given a k-ary recursive function f, we denote by f(x 1 , . . . , x k )↓ the formula ∃y ϕ f (x 1 , . . . , x k , y), and say that f converges on input x 1 , . . . , x k . Similarly, we denote by f(x 1 , . . . , x k )↑ the formula ¬f(x 1 , . . . , x k )↓, and say that f diverges on input x 1 , . . . , x n . We use f↓ as shorthand for
and f↑ as shorthand for ¬f↓.
A recursive function f is said to be provably recursive in a theory S ⊇ I∆ 0 +Exp if S ⊢ f↓. The provably recursive functions of I∆ 0 +Exp are exactly the Kalmar elementary functions. The class of Kalmar elementary functions is the smallest class containing successor, zero, projection, addition, multiplication, substraction, and closed under composition as well as bounded sums and bounded products ( [20] ). For a characterization of the provably recursive functions of IΣ n for n ≥ 1, see Theorem 3 in Section 3 below.
Metamathematics in I∆ 0 +Exp
It is well-known that arithmetization of syntax can be carried out in I∆ 0 +Exp. We assume as given some standard gödelnumbering of L-formulas, and write ϕ for the gödelnumber of ϕ. We shall often identify a formula with its gödelnumber, writing ψ(ϕ) instead of ψ( ϕ ).
Let S be a r.e. extension of I∆ 0 +Exp. As explained in Section 2.1, the set of axioms of S can be represented in I∆ 0 +Exp by a Σ 1 -formula ϕ S . Using the latter, one can define in a natural way a Σ 1 -formula Pr ϕ S (x) representing provability in S inside I∆ 0 +Exp ([5, Definition 4.1]). In this paper, we shall write Pr S instead of Pr ϕ S , having in mind some formula ϕ S representing the axioms of S in I∆ 0 +Exp in a natural way, by mimicking their informal definition. We refer to Pr S as the standard provability predicate of S.
We employ modal notation, writing S instead of Pr S . We write 0 as shorthand for I∆ 0 +Exp . By x we denote the formula containing x as a free variable, and such that for n > 0, n (the result of substituting n for x in x ) is IΣn . We write , or sometimes also ω , for PA . We write ✸ S ϕ as shorthand for ¬ S ¬ϕ.
We recall that PA is essentially reflexive, meaning that it proves the consistency of each of its finite subtheories, and the same holds for every consistent extension of PA in the language of arithmetic ([13, Theorem III.
2.35]).
We use the dot notation as usual, thus S ϕ(ẋ) means that the numeral for the value of x has been substituted for the free variable of the formula ϕ inside S . If the intended meaning is clear from the context, we will often simply write S ϕ(x) instead of S ϕ(ẋ). We recall that any theory S extending I∆ 0 +Exp is provably Σ 1 -complete, meaning that for any Σ 1 -formula σ,
It is well-known that if S is as above, then the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions hold for S verifiably in I∆ 0 +Exp:
We note that 2 and 3 also hold with internal variables ranging over ϕ and ψ. Theorem 1. Let ϕ be an L-formula whose free variables are exactly x 0 , . . . , x n . Then there is an L-formula ψ with exactly the same free variables, and such that
From the proof of Theorem 1 it is clear that if ϕ is Σ n (Π n ), then so is ψ. Verifiability of Löb's principle for S in I∆ 0 +Exp follows from the HilbertBernays-Löb derivability conditions for S , together with Theorem 1 ([2, Theorem 3.2]). This means that
and thus modal principles valid in the Gödel-Löb provability logic GL can be used when reasoning about S in I∆ 0 +Exp. For n ≥ 1, there is a partial truth definition True Πn (x) (True Σn (x)) in I∆ 0 +Exp for the class Π n (Σ n ) [13, V.5(b)]. Thus for every ϕ ∈ Π n (ϕ ∈ Σ n ) we have
Moreover, True Πn (x) and True Σn (x) satisfy Tarski's conditions (see [13, Definition I.1.74]). For all n ≥ 1, True Πn (x) is a Π n -formula, and True Σn (x) is a Σ n -formula.
Suppose α ∈ [1, ω] and n ≥ 1. By n α we denote the provability predicate for the theory IΣ α extended by all true Π n sentences. We formalize n α ϕ in a natural way using a partial truth definition:
where Π n -Sen denotes the set of all Gödel numbers of Π n -sentences. Here we can have quantifiers over α but not over n in the language of arithmetic. We use ✸ n α to denote the dual of n α , i.e. ✸ n α ϕ := ¬ n α ¬ϕ. The sentence ✸ n α ϕ is equivalent to uniform Π n+1 -reflection for IΣ α + ϕ, i.e. the principle saying that if for some Π n+1 -formula ψ(x) and every m the theory IΣ α + ϕ proves ψ(m), then ∀x ψ(x) is true.
Ordinals and the fast-growing hierarchy
We introduce a certain fast-growing hierarchy of recursive functions indexed by ordinals below ε 0 . We recall the basic facts concerning this hierarchy, including a characterization of the provably recursive functions of IΣ n , for n > 0.
In order to define the fast-growing functions, and to talk about them in our arithmetical theories, we need to represent ordinals below ε 0 as natural numbers. For that, it is useful to recall the Cantor normal form theorem:
The above representation of α is called its Cantor normal form. Since ε 0 is the least ordinal ε for which it holds that ε = ω ε , we see that if α < ε 0 , then α has a Cantor normal form with exponents α i < α, and these exponents in turn have Cantor normal form with yet smaller exponents. We represent an ordinal α below ε 0 by either the symbol 0 if α = 0, or otherwise its Cantor normal form
where each α i is represented in the same way. More formally, this means that for any ordinal below ε 0 , we fix a term built ω x , x + y, and 0. This method, known as Cantor ordinal notation system, is the most common way of representing ordinals below ε 0 .
In order to work with the above terms in arithmetic, we represent them as their Gödel numbers. We note that the predicate < and the standard functions of ordinal arithmetic (x+y, x·y and ω x ) on Cantor ordinal notations can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. Basic facts about ordinal arithmetic can be easily proven in I∆ 0 +Exp ([24, Section 3]); we will omit the details of this formalization in our proofs.
The fast-growing hierarchy
For an ordinal number α and n < ω, we define ω 
It is wellknown that the ordinal ε 0 can also be characterized as sup{ω n | n ∈ ω}; we therefore define ω ω := ε 0 .
A fundamental sequence for a countable limit ordinal λ is a strictly monotone sequence {λ[n]} n∈ω converging to λ from below, i.e. λ[n] < λ[n + 1] < λ for all n < ω, and sup{λ[n] | n ∈ ω} = λ. We consider the standard assignment of fundamental sequences to limit ordinals below ε 0 .
as follows:
Given a function F : N → N, we use exponential notation to denote repeated compositions of F, thus F 0 (x) = x, and
Definition 2. The fast-growing hierarchy {F α } α≤ε 0 of recursive functions is given by:
This exact version of the fast-growing hierarchy was first introduced by Solovay and Ketonen in [14] . Their results, together with results of Paris in [19] , imply the following classification of the provably recursive functions of PA:
The computation of F α (n) is closely connected to the following stepdown relation on ordinals. 
3. If α > β and F α ↓ then F β ↓.
If i > 0 and F
Lemma 3 (PA). For all numbers k, n, and
Lemma 4 (PA). For all numbers k, n, and
Proof. By the Lemma 3, we have ω 
. Now we use the latter and Lemma 2 to prove the lemma by induction on n. ⊠
Proof. Using Lemma 1 it is sufficient to show that α −→ n β. Consider the only sequnce γ 0 , . . . , γ r such that γ 0 = α, γ r = β, and
, for all i < r. We show by induction on i that for any i < r we have γ i −→ n γ i+1 and
either from induction assumption or if i = 0 we have it because F α (n)↓). We consider two cases: γ i is a limit ordinal and γ i is a successor ordinal. The case of successor ordinal is trivial. If γ i is a limit ordinal then from F γ i (n)↓ it follows that F γ i [n] (n)↓ and thus by Lemma 1 we have
from Lemma 1 it follows that F γ i+1 ↓(n). This finishes our inductive proof. Since we have γ i −→ n γ i+1 , for any i < r, we clearly have
Transfinite induction
Using the representation of ordinals in PA, we can formulate the schema of transfinite induction. For an ordinal α ≤ ε 0 and a number n ≥ 0, we write TI Πn -α for the following schema:
where ϕ is a Π n -formula. Since there is a Π n -partial truth definition True Πn in I∆ 0 +Exp (see Section 2.2), there is an instance of the schema that implies all other instances of it in I∆ 0 +Exp. We can thus identify TI Πn -α with this instance, and consider TI Πn -α to be a single formula. It follows from Gentzen's work in [10] that PA proves TI Πn -α for all n and α < ε 0 , and that it does not prove TI Π 0 -ε 0 . For a treatment of the amount of transfinite induction available in the fragments IΣ n of PA, see for example [24] .
Suppose we argue in PA, and want to show that a certain property ϕ holds for all ordinals less than some α < ε 0 . By the above, it suffices to show that
A formula ϕ for which (14) holds will be called progressive. We note that for any α ≤ ε 0 , IΣ 1 verifies that the formula F α ↓ is progressive, i.e. that
To see that (15) holds, note that by Definition 2, the following are verifiable in IΣ 1 :
Thus whether a function F α (for some α ≤ ε 0 ) is provably total in some extension T of IΣ n depends on the amount of transfinite induction available in T.
Transfinite iterations of provability predicates
In the present section we will give precise definitions of transfinite iterations of provability predicates and their duals. These notions are closely related to Turing-Feferman progressions [25, 6] . Our presentation of this subject is based on the approach from [1] which itself is based on [21] . Note, that for any elementary well-ordering (D, ≺) there are Σ 1 formulas of the language of first-order arihmetic L that are equivalent in EA to the standard defining formulas for D and ≺. Because EA is a conservative extension of I∆ 0 +Exp, the choice of the formulas above is unique up to I∆ 0 +Exp-provable equivalence. Thus we can freely talk about provability of facts about an elementary well ordering within theories containing I∆ 0 +Exp.
We will define transfinite iterations of provability predicates. Reflexive induction is an important method of reasoning about such iterations. 
. Then the sentence with stronger assumption is also derivable:
We can also weaken the conclusion:
Therefore by Löb's theorem we have
We fix for the rest of the section a Σ 1 -provability predicate △ for an arithmetical theory T containing I∆ 0 +Exp that satisfies Hilbert-BernaysLöb derivability conditions verifiably in I∆ 0 +Exp. We denote by ▽ the dual consistency predicate for △. Also, we fix an elementary linear ordering (D, ≺) such that the least element of (D, ≺) is 0 D and the fact that 0 D is the least element of (D, ≺) is verifiable I∆ 0 +Exp.
We define iterations of △ along (D, ≺): △ α ϕ, where α ∈ D and ϕ is an arithmetical sentence. An iteration △ x y is an arithmetical formula with two free variables such that
Here and below, if we refer to Gödel numbers of iterations, we could also use zero times iterations. We define △ 0 D ϕ to be equal to ϕ, i.e. more formally, △△ β ϕ should be written as
Existence of iterations follows from the Diagonal Lemma (Theorem 1). Simple inspection of the last argument shows that the resulting formula is Σ 1 . Actually any two iterations are I∆ 0 +Exp-provably equivalent (this fact resembles uniqueness of smooth progressions [1] ).
Lemma 8. For any two iterations
Proof. We use reflexive induction to prove it. We need to show that
By definition of an iteration the latter will follow from
Because there is a symmetry between (△ x y) 1 and (△ x y) 2 , it is enough to show that
Clearly, we have
Because T contains I∆ 0 +Exp we have
Hence (19) holds and we have (16) . ⊠
In the same fashion as iterations of △ we define the dual notion of iterations ▽ x y of ▽ . ▽ x y is an arithmetical formula with two free variables such
Existence of iterations ▽ x y again follows from Diagonal Lemma.
Lemma 9. For any two iterations (
Proof. Can be proved in the same fashion as Lemma 8. ⊠
Because we have existence and uniqueness (up to provable equivalence), we use iterations △ α ϕ and ▽ α ϕ freely, without specifing explicit formulas.
Let us denote by Succ D (α, β) the formula
Let us denote by D lim the set of all α ∈ D such that
Lemma 10 (I∆ 0 +Exp). The following properties of iterations of △ and ▽ hold:
Proof. The proof of items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is straightforward by using reflexive induction. Item 6 follows from item 5. We prove item 7 using item 3 and we prove item 8 using items 7 and 3. ⊠ Lemma 10 gives us a number of facts about iterations of provability predicates and their duals. We will frequently use them below without explicitely refering to them.
Note that items 2, 4, 6 of Lemma 10 yield I∆ 0 +Exp-verifiable HilbertBernays-Löb derivability conditions for each △ α . The latter with Lemma 10 item 1 means that each ▽ α is dual for the provability predicate △ α .
Lemma 11. Suppose T is an arithmetical theory such that I∆ 0 +Exp ⊆ T, △ 1 and △ 2 are Σ 1 provability predicates that satisfy I∆ 0 +Exp-verifiable HilbertBernays-Löb derivability conditions, and T ⊢ ∀ϕ (△ 1 ϕ → △ 2 ϕ). Then
Proof. By reflexive induction. ⊠
For the rest of the section we assume that (D, ≺) is Cantor ordinal notations for the ordinals ≤ ε 0 as defined in Section 3.
Proof. By reflexive induction on α. ⊠
Slow provability
Suppose that the theory S is given by a uniform r.e. enumeration {S n } n∈ω .
We can use any (partial) recursive function f to "slow down" provability in S, by considering the theory
The reason for adding I∆ 0 +Exp is to ensure that all our theories exhibit a minimal amount of nice behaviour (see Section 2) . From the definition, it is clear that S↾ f is a r.e. subtheory of S. If f is total, then S↾ f has exactly the same theorems as S. However this fact may not be verifiable in a theory where f is not provably total. Since {S n } n∈ω is uniformly r.e., there is an arithmetical formula Sx , containing x as a free variable, such that Sn is the provability predicate of S n . We assume that, verifiably in I∆ 0 +Exp, S ϕ is provably equivalent to ∃x Sx ϕ. The provability predicate Sx,f of S↾ f can be defined in a natural way:
Definition 5. The provability predicate Sx,f of S↾ f is defined as
If {S n } n∈ω is {IΣ n } n∈ω , we write f instead of Sx,f .
If f is total but not provably total in T, then from the point of view of T the formula Sx,f is a nonstandard provability predicate for S. On the other hand, Sx,f is a standard Σ 1 -provability predicate for the r.e. theory S↾ f . It therefore satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions verifiably in I∆ 0 +Exp (Section 2.2).
With Definition 5, the usual provability predicate for PA can be written as f , where f is any Kalmar elementary function (assuming I∆ 0 +Exp as our metatheory). It is easy to see that for any f, f ϕ is provably equivalent in I∆ 0 +Exp to the formula:
We recall the slow provability predicate studied in [9] , defined as:
We define, for z ∈ Z, F (z)
and consider the provability predicates
. For the sake of readability, we let
Thus the provability predicate in (24) becomes ⊡ 0 .
Remark 1. For any z, we can define a "shifted" enumeration {T z n } n∈ω of PA, such that ⊡ z is provably equivalent to T z x ,Fε 0 , by simply defining T z x as IΣ x+z .
In [9] , Theorem 4 below is proven for ⊡ 0 . In order to consider the more general case, we need one more definition.
Definition 6. We say that {S n } n∈ω is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable theories if there is a recursive sequence {S n -Ax} n∈ω such that for all n, S n is axiomatized by S n -Ax, and S n -Ax is finite. Proof. Suppose that PA ⊢ ⊥ → △⊥. Since △ϕ implies ϕ for all ϕ, we have
whence by Theorem 4,
Combining this with our assumption yields PA ⊢ △△⊥ → △⊥. By Löb's Theorem for △ (this follows from the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions for △), we now have that PA ⊢ △⊥ whence also PA ⊢ ⊥, contradiction. ⊠ Theorem 4 holds for a rather wide class of provability predicates △. In Section 9 below, we determine the joint provability logic of any such △ and ordinary PA-provability. In contrast, the following sections provide examples of properties where the exact axiomatization of slow provability leads to a radical difference in the behaviour of the corresponding provability predicates. In particular, we show that
where ⊡ α z denotes the α-iteration of ⊡ z (see Section 4). In Section 8, we shall furthermore show that there is a function r such that
Thus the slow provability predicates ⊡ 1 , ⊡ 2 , and r may be seen as the ε 0 -root, the ω-root, and the square root of ordinary provability, respectively.
Provability implies iterated slow provability
In the section we will show that in some cases provability of an arithmetical sentence in PA implies provability of the same sentence with respect to certain transfinite iterations of some slow provability predicates.
Lemma 14 (I∆ 0 +Exp). For all n and k we have n F ωn (k)↓.
Proof. In the case of n = 0 the statment of lemma holds because F ω 0 (x) = F 1 (x) = 2x + 1. In the rest of the proof we consider the case of n ≥ 1. Note that we have n (
Thus it is enough to show that for every α < ω n we have n F α ↓. Since the theory IΣ 1 proves that F α ↓ is a progressive formula (see Section 3.2) and F α ↓ is a Π 2 -formula, we have
Hence it is enough to show that for all α < ω n we have n TI Π 2 -α.
If n = 1 then we only need to show that for any number m we have n TI Π 2 -m. Clearly, for every m we have I∆ 0 +Exp ⊢ TI Π 2 -m → TI Π 2 -m + 1. Thefore for any m we have I∆ 0 +Exp ⊢ TI Π 2 -m and hence n TI Π 2 -m. Thus we will consider only the case of n ≥ 2.
In [24, Theorem 4.1] it has been shown that if 0 < m ≤ n and ω ≤ α < ε 0 then I∆ 0 proves that TI Πn -α implies TI Πm -β for all β < ω α ω n−m ; a simple inspection of the proof shows that that the argument could be formalized in I∆ 0 +Exp. Thus for all α < ω n we have 1 (TI Πn -ω → TI Π 2 -α). But TI Πn -ω is just Π n -induction for natural numbers and is well-known to be equivalent in I∆ 0 to Σ n -induction [13, Theorem I.2.4]. Therefore for all α < ω n we have n TI Π 2 -α. ⊠ Corollary 15. Suppose S n is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable theories such that PA proves that PA = n∈ω S n . Let △ denote the provability predicate Sx,Fε 0 . Then PA ⊢ ∀ϕ ( ϕ → △ϕ).
Lemma 16 (IΣ 1 ). Suppose ϕ is an arithmetical sentence and we have ϕ.
Then there exists a number n such that ⊡ n 2 ϕ.
Proof. Because we have ϕ we also have n ϕ for some n. If n < 2 then because F ε 0 (1)↓, we have ⊡ Theorem 6. Suppose S n is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable theories such that PA proves that PA = n∈ω S n and IΣ n+2 ⊆ S n . Let △ denote the provability predicate Sx,Fε 0 . Then PA proves that for every arithmetical sentence ϕ we have ϕ iff △ ω ϕ.
Lemma 17 (IΣ 1 ). Suppose α < ε 0 and n is a number. Then
We use reflexive induction and hence it is sufficient to show (while reasoning in IΣ 1 ) that for every α ≤ ε 0 , if 1 ∀β < α ∀x ω β 1 F β (x)↓ then for every m we have
We reason in IΣ 1 . Let us consider three cases: α = 0, α is a limit ordinal, and α is a successor ordinal. In the first case we need to show that 1 F 0 (n)↓ which is clearly true. In the second case 
Thus we have
This finishes the proof in the successor case. ⊠ Lemma 18. Suppose S n is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable theories such that PA proves that PA = n∈ω S n . Let △ denote the provability predicate Sx,Fε 0 . Then PA proves that for every arithmetical sentence ϕ such that ϕ we have △ ε 0 ϕ.
Proof. Let us reason in PA. For some n we have Sn ϕ. From Lemma 17 it follows that we have
Since for some n the theory IΣ 1 ⊆ S n , in PA the predicate △ is at least as strong as . Therefore by Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 we have
Finally, by Lemma 12 we have △ ε 0 ϕ. ⊠
Models for slow consistency
In this section we will show that for the slow provability predicate ⊡ 1 , the theory PA proves that ⊡ ε 0 1 is equivalent to . We also show that in addition to ⊡ 1 a large family of provability predicates has the same property.
We will use model-theoretic techniques while reasoning in PA. We briefly present basic definitions of formalization of model theory within arithmetic. A model of finite signature is a tuple of formulas that give the domain, as well as interpretations of the constant, functional, and predicate symbols. A full model is a model with a satisfaction relation for all first-order sentences of the signature of the model given by their Gödel numbers. Note that for a model without satisfaction relation there is no straightforward way to formalize in PA whether the model satisfies some infinite set of axioms, hence when we will talk about models of PA within PA, we will assume that the models are full models. We will formalize our model-theoretic arguments within PA and since full induction schema is present, our arguments will not depend on the complexity of formulas giving models. We also recall that Gödel Completeness theorem is formalizable in PA, i.e. in PA the consistency of a theory T implies the existence of a full model of T. Also, in PA the existence of some full model for a theory T implies the consistency of T.
For models of arithmetical theories we also consider partial satisfaction relation that are defined only for Π n (or equivalently, Σ n ) formulas. Note that if we fix a number k externally, then in PA we can construct a Π n+k partial satisfaction relation from a Π n partial satisfaction relation. Also note that since PA proves the Cut Elimination Theorem, it also proves that if T is an arithmetical theory axiomatizable by a recursive set of Π n -formulas and there is a model of T with a Π n partial satisfaction relation, then T is consistent.
For a proper presentation of the basic definitions and the proofs of basic theorems of model theory in formal arithmetic the reader is referred to [13, I.4(b) ].
Below we work with non-standard models of arithmetical signature, all of them will be models of I∆ 0 +Exp. Because standard natural numbers are embeddable as initial segments in every model of I∆ 0 +Exp we freely assume that every such model contains the standard numbers.
Suppose that M is a model of I∆ 0 +Exp. A cut I of M is a submodel of M such that for any a ∈ M and b ∈ J, if M |= a < b, then we have a ∈ I. For every cut I and an element a ∈ M we write I < a if ∀b ∈ I (M |= b < a) and we write a < I if a ∈ I. We assume that the model M is given by some fixed tuple of arithmetical formulas, possibly with additional parameters. Then there are arithmetical formulas ϕ(x, n, α, a, b, c) and ψ(y, n, α, a, b, c) such that PA proves that if n, α, a, b, c satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7 then the set of all x from M for which ϕ(x, n, α, a, b, c) holds is a cut I, the formula ψ(y, n, α, a, b, c) gives a Π n partial satisfaction relation for I, and the cut I satisfies the conclusion of Theorem 7. A result close to the following theorem goes back to Paris [19] . In the form given below the theorem can be derived from results of Beklemishev [1, Theorem 1, Proposition 7.3, Remark 7.4], Freund has proved this theorem explicitely [7] for the case of α < ω.
Proof. In [7] it has been proved that
We need to prove that IΣ 1 ⊢ ✸ 1 ω ⊤ ↔ F ε 0 ↓. Clearly,
From Lemma 1 it follows that I∆ 0 +Exp ⊢ ∀x F ωx ↓ ↔ F ε 0 ↓. Thus indeed Proof. We reason in PA. In order to prove our claim we consider two cases
We start with the case of 1 ⊥. From Theorem 9 for the case of α = ω it follows that there exists n 0 such that F ε 0 (n 0 )↑ and hence F ε 0 (n)↑, for every n ≥ n 0 . Thus for all n ≥ n 0 and arithmetical sentences ψ we have ✸ · 1 ψ if ✸ n ψ. By straightforward calculations we exclude cases n 0 = 0, 1. Hence n 0 ≥ 2.
Suppose we have been given an arithmetical sentence ϕ such that ✸ϕ. We need to show that ✸ ·
Thus it is sufficient to show that for every α < ε 0 we have ✸✸ · α 1 ϕ. By Completeness Theorem we have a model M of PA+ ϕ. Let us consider arbitrary n > n 0 . We will construct a cut I n of M such that I n is a model of I∆ 0 +Exp + TI Π 1 -ω n+1 + F ε 0 (n)↑.
First, assume that we have already contstructed the cut I n . Giving that PA is essentially reflexive, M |= ✸ n ϕ. Hence because ✸ n ϕ is Π 1 we have I n |= ✸ n ϕ. Combining Theorem 8, Remark 3, and Theorem 9 we see that
We prove by transfinite induction that ✸ · α 1 ϕ, for all non-zero α < ω n+1 . The base holds because ✸ · 1 ϕ follows from ✸ n ϕ. The limit case follows directly from definition. For the successor case we use the fact that ✸ · α 1 ϕ is Π 1 and that IΣ n is consistent with all true Π 1 -sentences. Thus we obtain ✸ n ✸ · α 1 ϕ and next ✸ · ϕ. This finishes the inductive proof. In order to prove our claim we note that
Thus if I n will have the above properties, we will have I n |= ✸ n ✸ · α 1 ϕ, for all non-zero α < ω n+1 Now we will construct the cut I n . From Theorem 3 it follows that PA ⊢ F ω n+1 ↓ and thus M |= F ε 0 (n)↓. Let us denote by u ∈ M the non-standard number such that M |= F ε 0 (n) = u.
Since F ε 0 (n)↓ is a Σ 1 -sentence, for every cut I such that I < u, we have I |= F ε 0 (n)↑. Thus it is sufficient to take as I n any cut I such that I < u and
Let us denote by a ∈ M the nonstandard number such that
We denote by b the nonstandard number such that
Now we can apply Theorem 7 with c = a and obtain a cut I such that a < I < b and I |= I∆ 0 +Exp + TI Π 1 -ω n+1 .
We claim that M |= u > b = F ωn·a (a) and thus that I n < u. Clearly, for any k < n + 1 we will get a limit ordinal by applying operation α −→ α[n] exactly k times to ω n+1 . Thus n + 1 is the least r such that ω n+1 r −→ n β + 1 for some β . We denote by β the ordinal such that ω n+1 n+1 −→ n β + 1. Since n > n 0 ≥ 2, the ordinal β is greater than ω 2 n . Also, β is greater than ω n 0 +1 . Using induction we derive that ω n+1 −→ 
Hence we have proved our claim. Thus for every n and α < ω n+1 we have a model of I∆ 0 +Exp + ✸ n ✸ · α 1 ϕ. Thus for every n and α < ε 0 we have a model of I∆ 0 +Exp + ✸ n ✸ · α 1 ϕ, since for every ψ and n 1 < n 2 we have I∆ 0 +Exp ⊢ ✸ n 2 ψ → ✸ n 1 ψ. Note that every Π 1 -sentence that holds in some model of I∆ 0 +Exp is true. Thus for every α < ε 0 and number n we have ✸ n ✸ · α 1 ϕ. Therefore, for every α < ε 0 we have ✸✸ · α 1 ϕ. And therefore ✸ · ε 0 1 ϕ. Now assume that ✸ 1 ⊤. Suppose we have been given an arithmetical sentence ϕ such that ✸ϕ. By Löb's Theorem for ✸ 1 we have ✸ 1 ¬ ✸ 1 ⊤. Thus because ✸ϕ is Π 1 , we have ✸ 1 (¬ ✸ 1 ⊤∧✸ϕ). Therefore we have ✸(¬ ✸ 1 ⊤∧✸ϕ).
Note that formalization of the first part of the proof gives us
Using that we conclude that ✸(∀α < ε 0 ✸✸ · α 1 ϕ). Next we see that ∀α < ε 0 ✸✸ · α 1 ϕ is a Π 1 -sentence. Therefore we have ∀α
Using Lemma 19 and Lemma 18, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 10 (PA). Suppose ϕ is a sentence and α < ε 0 is a non-zero ordinal. Then the following sentences are equivalent:
Using Lemma 11 and Lemma 18 we can generalize the previous theorem to a wider spectrum of provability predicates:
Theorem 11. Suppose S n is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable theories such that PA proves that PA = n∈ω S n and S n ⊂ IΣ n+1 . Let △ denote the provability predicate
. Then PA proves that for every arithmetical sentence ϕ, and non-zero ordinal α < ε 0 the following sentences are equivalent:
8 Square root of PA-provability
Recall that for a recursive function f we denote by f the slowdown of standard PA-provability predicate by the function f:
We are going to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 12.
There exists a fast-growing recursive function r such that PA ⊢ ∀ϕ( r r ϕ ↔ ϕ).
First we define the required function r and auxiliary function l. The function r will be a function that grows faster than any F ωn , but considerably slower than F ε 0 . Definition 7. We define function l by recursion. We give l(n) under the assumptions that for all m < n the values l(m) are already defined:
We define the function r as following:
Lemma 20 (I∆ 0 +Exp). The following holds:
1. l is total; 2. there exists n such that l(n) = 1;
3. function l is monotone-nondecreasing; 4. for every n, we have r(l(n))↓;
5. for every n, we have r(l(n)) ≤ n if l(n) ≥ 1;
6. for every n such that r(n)↓, we have l(r(n)) = n.
Proof. Straightforward using definition of l, r and Lemma 1. ⊠ Lemma 21 (IΣ 1 ). For every n, if r(n)↓ then for all m < n we have r(m)↓ and r(m) < r(n).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 Item 1 and easily provable fact that if F α (n)↓ and n > m then F α (n) > F α (m). ⊠ Lemma 22 (IΣ 1 ). For every arithmetical sentence ϕ, if we have ϕ then we have r r ϕ.
Proof. Suppose we have ϕ. Then there is a number n such that n ϕ. Remark 4. Theorem 13 can be formalized in PA in the same fashion as Theorem 7 in Remark 2. We assume that the model M is given by some fixed tuple of arithmetical formulas, possibly with additional parameters. Then there are arithmetical formulas ϕ(x, n, a, b, e) and ψ(y, n, a, b, e) such that PA proves that if n, a, b, e satisfy the conditions of Theorem 13 then the set of all x from M for which ϕ(x, n, a, b, e) is a cut I, the formula ψ(y, n, a, b, e) gives a Π n partial satisfaction relation for I, and the cut I satisfies the conclusion of Theorem 13.
Lemma 23 (PA). For every arithmetical sentence ϕ, if ✸ϕ then ✸ r ✸ r ϕ.
Proof. Let us consider a model M of PA + ϕ. If M |= ✸ r ϕ then we are already done. So we assume that M |= ✸ r ϕ. Thus there exist u ∈ M such that M |= ✸ u ϕ ∧ ¬✸ u+1 ϕ ∧ r(u + 1)↓. From Lemma 21 it follows that M |= r(u)↓ and r(u) < r(u + 1). Note that u is a non-standard number because PA is an essentially reflexive theory and thus for every standard m we have M |= ✸ m ϕ.
We are going to prove that for every n such that r(n)↓ we have a cut J n of M such that r(u) < J n < r(u + 1), the cut J n have Π n satisfaction relation, and J n |= IΣ n . If we prove our claim then for every cut J n , we will have PA↾ r = IΣ u within it and hence J n |= ✸ r ϕ. Since every cut J n that we will construct will have Π n partial satisfaction relation and will be a model of IΣ n , we can conclude that ✸ n ✸ r ϕ, for every n such that r(n)↓. Hence we will have ✸ r ✸ r ϕ, contradiction. Now let us prove the claim. We take a, b, e ∈ M:
(a), and M |= e = u and apply Theorem 13 to construct the required cut. Now we need to check that we indeed have r(u) < J n < r(u + 1). For this, it is enough to show that M |= F ω u n−1 (r(u)) ≤ r(u + 1).
Since u is a non-standard number, we have M |= r(n) < u. From Lemma 20 item 3. it follows that M |= l(u) ≥ l(r(n)). From Lemma 20 item 6. it follows that l(r(n)) = n. Thus M |= l(u + 1) ≥ l(u) ≥ n. We see that
and
0. Now we use Lemma 5 and Lemma 4 and deduce that
Therefore from Lemma 1 it follows that
+1 (u)↓ and Lemma 1 we conclude that
Next using Corollary 5 and Lemma 5 we deduce that
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 6 it follows that that
Thus we have obtained the required cut J n . ⊠ From Lemma 22 and Lemma 23 it follows that Theorem 12 holds.
Bimodal provability logics
We determine the joint provability logic of a wide class of pairs of provability predicates, including ordinary provability together with any of the slow provability predicates ⊡ z . This result was obtained in cooperation with Volodya Shavrukov. The relevant bimodal system is GLT, or Lindström logic, first studied by Lindström ([15] ) due to its relation to Parikh's rule. The latter allows one to infer ϕ from Pr PA (ϕ). Since Parikh's rule is admissible in PA, adding it to PA does not yield new theorems. As shown in [18] , it does yield speed-up, meaning that some theorems have much shorter proofs when Parikh's rule is allowed. The equivalence of Parikh provability and ordinary provability is however not verifiable in PA.
In Section 9.4 we establish the joint provability logic of ordinary provability together with square root provability.
The system GLT
We work with the languages L and L △ of propositional unimodal and bimodal logic respectively. The symbols and △ are thus used for the modalities, not as abbreviations for arithmetical formulas as until now. As before, ✸A and ▽ A are written as shorthand for ¬ ¬A and ¬△¬A respectively. Definition 8. The axiom schemata of GL include all propositional tautologies in the language L , and furthermore:
The inference rules of GL are modus ponens and necessitation: if ⊢ GL A then ⊢ GL A.
A relation ≺ on a set W is said to be conversely well-founded if for every S ⊆ W with S = ∅, there is some a ∈ W such that a ⊀ b for all b ∈ S. A conversely well-founded relation is, in particular, irreflexive. We write a b if either a ≺ b or a = b.
Definition 9. A GL-frame F is a tuple W, ≺ , where ≺ is a transitive conversely well-founded relation on W . F is said to be tree-like if there is a root r ∈ W such that for all a ∈ W , r a, and furthermore each a = r has a unique immediate ≺-predecessor b.
Definition 10. A GL-model is a triple W, ≺, , where W, ≺ is a GLframe, and a valuation assigning to every propositional letter a subset of W .
is extended to all formulas of L by requiring that it commutes with the propositional connectives, and interpreting ≺ as the accessibility relation for :
M, a A if for all b with a ≺ b, b A.
Given M = W, ≺, , we write M A if M, a A for every a ∈ W . We write F A if M A for any model M whose underlying frame is F . Theorem 14. ⊢ GL A iff for every tree-like GL-frame F , F A.
Proof. See for example Chapter 5 of [2] . ⊠ Definition 11. The axiom schemata of GLT include all propositional tautologies in the language L △ , the rules and axiom schemata of GL for △, as well as:
It is not difficult to show that ⊢ GLT ( A → A) → A. Thus GLT contains GL for both △ and .
Given a tree-like GL-frame W, ≺ and a, b ∈ W , we write a ≺ ∞ b if the set {c | a ≺ c ≺ b} is infinite. It is shown in [15] that GLT is sound and complete with respect to the class all of tree-like GL-frames, with ≺ and ≺ ∞ as the accessibility relations for △ and respectively. We consider a slightly different semantics for GLT that -while arguably less neat than the one just described -has the advantage of allowing us to work with finite models. Indeed, it was introduced by Lindström in order to obtain decidability of GLT.
Definition 12. For A ∈ L △ , an A-sound model is a quadruple W, ≺, ≺ R , , where 1. W, ≺ is a finite tree-like GL-frame
there is some c with a ≺ R c b, and such that c △B → B for every subformula B of A. Such a node c shall be referred to as reflexive.
Finally, is a valuation satisfying the usual clauses, with ≺ and ≺ R as the accessibility relations for △ and respectively.
Lemma 25. [15, Lemma 9] Let n be the cardinality of the set of subformulas of A. ⊢ GLT A iff M A for every A-sound model of cardinality ≤ n n 2 +1 .
Arithmetical interpretations of modal logic
In order to formulate the connection between GLT and our arithmetical provability predicates, we use the notion of an arithmetical realization.
Definition 13. Let Pr 0 and Pr 1 be provability predicates in the language L of arithmetic. An arithmetical realization * is an assignment of L-sentences to all modal formulas. The values of * at propositional letters of the modal language can be arbitrary. It is required that * commutes with the propositional connectives, and furthermore ( A) * := Pr 0 ( A * ) and (△A) * = Pr 1 ( A * ).
We note that the values of an arithmetical realization * are determined by its values at the propositional letters of L △ . Definition 14. Let Pr 0 and Pr 1 be provability predicates for a theory T containing I∆ 0 +Exp. We say that GL (GLT) is sound for Pr 0 (and Pr 1 ) if:
* for all arithmetical realizations * .
We say that GL (GLT) is complete for Pr 0 (and Pr 1 ) if:
If GL (GLT) is both sound and complete with respect to Pr 0 (and Pr 1 ), we say that GL (GLT) is the provability logic of Pr 0 (and Pr 1 ). This means that GL (GLT) contains exactly those principles of provability in T -as given by Pr 0 and Pr 1 respectively -that can be verified in I∆ 0 +Exp.
Theorem 15. Let T ⊇ I∆ 0 +Exp be recursively axiomatizable and Σ 1 -sound. Then GL is the provability logic of Pr T .
Proof. The case where T = PA was proven by Solovay in [23] . Extension to Σ 1 -sound recursively axiomatizable theories containing I∆ 0 +Exp is due to de Jongh, Jumelet, and Montagna in [3] . ⊠ Throughout the rest of this section, we use the symbols and △ for both provability predicates and modalities. Since lower-case Greek letters range over arithmetical and upper-case Latin letters over modal sentences, the intended meaning will always be clear from the context. With this notation, we also imply that we are interested in arithmetical realizations interpreting the modalities △ and as the corresponding provability predicates. Bearing this in mind we shall, from now on, mostly skip referring to the explicit formalization of Definition 13.
Arithmetical soundness and completeness
We prove the following arithmetical completeness theorem. Assume furthermore that GLT is sound for and △. Then GLT is also complete for and △.
Remark 5. With the above interpretation of , we depart from the convention that stands for the ordinary provability predicate of PA.
Lemma 26. Let {S n } n∈ω be a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable theories such that PA proves PA = n∈ω S n . Write △ for Sx,Fε 0 , and for the usual provability predicate of PA. Then PA verifies the following, for all ϕ:
Proof. Item 1 is clear from the definition, item 2 follows by provable Σ 1 -completeness of △, 3 is Corollary 15 in Section 6, and 4 is Theorem 4 in Section 5.
⊠ By Remark 1 in Section 5, it follows that the requirements of Theorem 16 are satisfied when taking for the usual provability predicate of PA, and for △ any of the slow provability predicates ⊡ z . We note that the requirements of Theorem 16 are also satisfied when taking for △ the usual provability predicate of PA, and for the provability predicate for PA together with Parikh's rule 1 . We assume all Σ 1 -sentences to be of the form ∃y ψ, with ψ a ∆ 0 -formula. If ϕ is a Σ 1 -sentence, we write n : ϕ to mean that n is a witness for ϕ, i.e. if ψ(n) holds. We also assume:
1. if n : ϕ, then for any ψ = ϕ it is not the case that n : ψ 2. if there is some n with n : ϕ, then there are arbitrarily large n ′ with n ′ : ϕ
The above requirements hold for any reasonable arithmetization of syntax in arithmetic. For every Σ 1 -formula ϕ, there exists a formula ∃y ψ satisfying 1 and 2 that is I∆ 0 +Exp-provably equivalent to ϕ; thus the above assumption does not restrict us in any way. Let T, and △ be as in the statement of Theorem 16. Our proof of arithmetical completeness proceeds, as usual, by constructing a suitable Solovay function moving along the accessibility relations of a GLT-model. For the remainder of this section, fix some A-sound model M = W, ≺, ≺ R , . We 1 Lindström's proof of arithmetical completeness of GLT with respect to ordinary provability and Parikh provability p made essential use of the fact that PA ⊢ ∀ϕ ( p ϕ ↔ ω ϕ). While, as follows from the results of Section 6, the same relation holds between and ⊡ 2 , it fails for and ⊡ 1 , where we only have PA ⊢ ∀ϕ ( ϕ ↔ ⊡ ε0 1 ϕ). Our proof method does not rely on △ being a certain ordinal iteration of , and is therefore applicable to a wider class of predicates.
assume that M has a root, i.e. that there is a node 0 ∈ W such that 0 ≺ a for every 0 = a ∈ W . We also assume as given L-formulas representing M in I∆ 0 +Exp in a natural way. For a ∈ W , L = a is the formula expressing that a is the limit of h. As usual, the apparent circularity in the definition of h is dealt with by using the Diagonal Lemma (see [23] or [2] ).
The function h starts at the root 0, and moves along the relations ≺ and ≺ R . It makes an ≺ R -step to some node b only if there is a -proof that it will not stay there, and it makes an ≺-step to some node c only if there is a △-proof that it will not stay there. We refer to the elements of the domain of h as stages, saying for example that h moved to a at stage n if h(n − 1) = h(n) = a.
Lemma 27. (I∆ 0 +Exp) h has a unique limit.
Proof. Since a ≺ R b implies a ≺ b, it is clear from the definition that h moves along the ≺-relation in M. Since ≺ is transitive, we thus have that h(x) h(y) whenever x < y. If h were to keep moving forever, there would be an infinite ascending ≺-chain in M, contradicting the assumption that W, ≺ is a GL-frame. ⊠ Let ϕ h (x, y) be an L-formula representing h in I∆ 0 +Exp in a natural way. According to Lemma 27, I∆ 0 +Exp ⊢ ∃!y ∃x 0 ∀x ≥ x 0 ϕ h (x, y).
In the remainder of this section, we work in a definitional expansion of I∆ 0 +Exp that contains a term L denoting the limit of h. We note that by (32) such a definitional expansion is a conservative extension of I∆ 0 +Exp.
Proof. Assume L = a. By Lemma 31, we have △ a L, whence also a L. Since a = 0 and h moved to a, it must be that L = a. It therefore suffices to show that if b is such that a ≺ b but a ⊀ R b, then L = b. We assume that the claim has been established for all b ′ with a ≺ b ′ ≺ b, i.e. that we have L = b ′ for all such b ′ . Since L = a = 0, h must have moved to a at some stage t. Then either L = a or △ L = a holds, but in either case L = a. Argue in : We have h(t) = a, L = a, and L = b ′ for all b ′ with a ≺ b ′ ≺ b. Thus h has to eventually move away from any node in {a} ∪ {b ′ | a ≺ b ′ ≺ b}. Consider the first stage where this happens, i.e. let s > t be minimal with h(s) / ∈ {a} ∪ {b ′ | a ≺ b ′ ≺ b}, and let c = h(s). Since h(t) = a and t < s, we have a ≺ c. We consider two cases: 
Then for every subformula B of A, and every a ∈ M, a = 0
Square root provability
We conclude with a characterization of the provability logic of square root and ordinary provability. In Section 8, it was shown that there is a provability predicate r such that PA ⊢ ∀ϕ ( r r ϕ ↔ ϕ) ,
where denotes the usual provability predicate of PA. By Theorem 15, r satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions (verifiably in I∆ 0 +Exp). As we will see, the equivalence in (37) is in fact sufficient for obtaining all propositional schemata concerning and r that are provable in PA. In the remainder of this section, we shall introduce the bimodal logic GL2, and sketch the proof of its arithmetical completeness with respect to and r .
Definition 16. The axiom schemata of GL2 include all propositional tautologies in the language L △ , the rules and axioms of GL for △, as well as:
(2) A ↔ △△A Given a tree-like GL-frame W, ≺ and a, b ∈ W , write a ≺ 2 b if there is some c with a ≺ c ≺ b.
Lemma 36. GL2 is sound and complete with respect to the class of treelike GL-frames, with ≺ and ≺ 2 as the accessibility relations for △ and respectively.
Proof. Easy exercise.
⊠ It is proven in [26, Section 7] that GL2 is the joint provability logic of I∆ 0 +Exp-provability and cut-free provability in I∆ 0 +Exp. Theorem 17. GL2 is the provability logic of r and .
Proof. Suppose that GL2 A. By Lemma 36, there is a GL2 model M = W, ≺, with M A. By applying the usual Solovay construction for GL, we find for all a ∈ M a statement L = a in the language of arithmetic, such that for all modal sentences B not containing any occurrences of :
